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The Internet and Its Discontents: 3-D Printing,
The Commerce Clause, And A Possible
Solution to an Inevitable Problem
Jeffrey T. Leslie*
I. INTRODUCTION
Hunter: "S***, that's light. What's it made of?"
Leary: "Composite. Like plastic. "I
At the time In the Line of Fire was filmed, the idea of an entirely plastic
firearm was a thing of fantasy. Deadly and undetectable, the idea of a crimi-
nal or an assassin getting his hands on a plastic firearm was terrifying. How-
ever, science fiction can, at times, make bold predictions about what the
future holds. While plastic firearms are still in a quasi-beta phase, the tech-
nology is here and the reality of plastic firearms being printed in a living
room near you is here. Technology has vastly improved both over time.
Technology has come to the point where people can now potentially produce
their own firearms in their living room with just the Internet and a 3-D
printer. A group in Texas, Defense Distributed, test-fired the first all plastic
firearm on May 1, 2013 and the group has declared its goal of bringing this
technology to you and your neighbor through the Internet.2
This emerging technology has alarmed Congress, which in December of
2013 attempted to address the emerging technology head on by amending
and reenacting the Undetectable Firearm Act of 1988.3 However, Congress
was unable to amend the Act, thus leaving it with the exact same language it
contained before 3-D printing was even available.4 Therefore, the Act uses
language and references to a cultural and technological time period almost
three decades old.5 This is problematic and raises issues that challenge the
Act's effectiveness. Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), a co-sponsor of
the legislation, released a statement that captures the current mood in Con-
gress about 3-D technology and firearms:
I applaud reauthorization of the Undetectable Firearms Act to en-
sure a new generation of stealth weapons made with 3D printing
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1. See IN THE LINE OF FIRE (Columbia Pictures Corporation 1993).
2. Joshua Sager, Plastic Guns will Reveal Real NRA, CHI. SUN-TiMES, May 31,
2013, at 19.
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (p)(1) (2012).
4. See id.
5. See id.
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technology don't go undetected. This is only a first step though, as
there are still loopholes in the Undetectable Firearms Act that
must be closed. We must not allow a 3-D printer cartridge to be-
come as deadly as a gun cartridge. I look forward to continuing to
work with my colleagues and the ATF to ensure this legislation is
permanently reauthorized and any loopholes are closed.6
Although the Act is a step in the right direction, it is ill-equipped to
regulate this emerging technology because the loopholes are troubling. This
comment discusses the shortcomings of the Undetectable Firearms Act pro-
poses two possible solutions to the inevitable issue of home-manufactured 3-
D plastic firearms. An analysis of the Commerce Clause and its potential to
regulate the Internet produces a possible remedy that the Undetectable Fire-
arm Act could not-the ability to regulate. The Undetectable Firearm Act
seeks to ban all firearms without barium sulfate (the mechanism by which
detectors "pickup" the firearm) and those firearms that fail to look like fire-
arms in an x-ray. 7 The Act was written in the 1980s, nearly two decades
before 3-D technology was invented, and does not mention 3-D firearms.8
However, 3-D printed firearms could be effectively regulated in a less direct
way-the Internet. Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the In-
ternet in relation to the Commerce Clause, New York's Southern District has.
In American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, the court makes an argument that the
Internet substantially affects the stream of commerce and is therefore subject
to regulation.9 Using the court's reasoning, the Internet, and CAD (Computer
Animated Design) designs of 3-D printed firearms on various databases,
could be regulated. Although controversial, this solution would allow Con-
gress to regulate a potentially problematic development in technology and it
may allow them to bypass any Second Amendment controversy. The second
solution relies on Wickard v. Filburn, which ruled that a farmer who pro-
duces his own crops for personal consumption affects the stream of com-
merce and is thus subject to the Commerce Clause.lO Analogizing this case, it
could be argued that home manufacturing of 3-D printed firearms, metal or
plastic, substantially affects a $33 billion a year industry. Thus, Congress
may have the ability to regulate 3-D printed firearms through the Commerce
Clause without having to navigate the Second Amendment.
6. Sen. Edward Markey, Markey Commends Reauthorization of Undetectable
Firearms Act, (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-re-
Ieases/markey-commends-reauthorization-of-undetectable-firearms-act.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (p)(l).
8. See id.
9. See American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
10. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942).
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
"Don't take your guns to town son
Leave your guns at home
A. 3-D Printing
In his 2013 State of the Union address, President Obama saw 3-D print-
ing as a beacon of hope in a tough economy, "A once-shuttered warehouse is
now a state-of-the-art lab where new workers are mastering the 3D printing
that has the potential to revolutionize the way we make almost everything."12
The President was most certainly correct, more than most people may have
realized at first. At its most basic and mundane level, 3-D printing is "a
manufacturing process for the rapid production of three-dimensional parts
directly from computer models."'3 The process stacks layer upon layer of
"two-dimensional" printing to produce a 3-D object.14 The computer model
is translated into an algorithm that draws the detailed information on every
layer similar to an ink-jet printer.15 Then a "piston that supports the powder
bed and the part in progress lowers so that the next powder layer can be
spread and selectively joined. This layer-by-layer process repeats until the
part is completed."16 The object is then heat-treated and any unbound powder
is removed, thus leaving the fabricated par.' 7 3-D printing is described as
"additive manufacturing," which is a "process of joining materials to make
objects from 3-D model data, usually layer upon layer, as opposed to subtrac-
tive manufacturing."18 3-D printing has the potential to produce a lot of very
useful objects. In fact, researchers at Wake Forest Baptist Medical Center are
embarking on a project to produce the "body on a chip" project using 3-D
11. JOHNNY CASH, DON'T TAKE YOUR GUNS To TOWN (Columbia Records 1958).
12. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013), available
at http://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/20 l3/02/12/remarks-president-
state-union-address.
13. Emanuel Sachs et al., Three Dimensional Printing: Rapid Tooling and Proto-




16. Id. at 28.
17. Id.
18. Julian J. Johnson, Note, Print, Lock, and Load: 3-D Printers, Creation of Guns,
and the Potential Threat to Fourth Amendment Rights, 13 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL'Y 337, 338 (Fall 2013) (citing Hod Lipson & Melba Kurman, Factory @
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printing or "bioprinting."19 The "body on a chip" technology seeks to create a
mini human-organ system about the size of a quarter to test the body's re-
sponse to drugs.2 0 The ultimate goal of bioprinting is to create "large, func-
tional, implantable organs that will address the growing gap between viable
organ supply and demand for transplants."21
However, others have focused on producing other things with 3-D print-
ing technology. In July of 2012, an amateur gunsmith named Michael Gus-
lick managed to construct and shoot a pistol made partly out of plastic, 3-D
printed parts.22 Guslick then adapted those parts to make a fully functional
AR-15 rifle.23 According to Guslick, the process "wasn't difficult."24 Guslick
obtained the gun blueprints online "from a website."25 However, Guslick's
creation was not entirely made from 3-D printed parts. He also used off-shelf
metal components to complete the gun.26
While Michael Guslick's AR-15 really pushed the bounds of 3-D print-
ing in a non-commercial setting, some want to push it even further. A group
out of Austin, Texas called "Defense Distributed" has begun a campaign
called "Wiki Weapon Project," which seeks to bring a fully functional fire-
arm made entirely of plastic to your living room. 27 Cody Wilson, the group's
de facto leader, wants to create a completely plastic gun that can be
downloaded via the Internet and printed at the consumer's convenience.28
Wilson and Defense Distributed have successfully fired an entirely 3D-
printed gun. The gun fired a .380 caliber bullet into a pile of dirt.29 Wilson
19. Sophie Novack, The Next Frontier for 3-D Printing: Human Organs, NAT. J.




22. Dominique Mosbergen, Michael Guslick, Amateur Gunsmith, Claims to Have
Used 3D Printer to Make Functional Semiautomatic AR-15 Rifle at Home,






27. Wiki Weapon Project Aims to Create Workable Guns from 3D Printers, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/27/
make-a-gun-at-home-wiki-weapon-project-_n 182813 .html.
28. Andy Greenberg, Meet the 'Liberator': Test-Firing the World's First Fully 3D-
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calls the firearm the "Liberator" in homage to the cheap, one-shot pistol de-
livered to the French resistance by the Allies during the Nazi occupation in
World War 11.30 Defense Distributed's Liberator is almost entirely made of
plastic:
[fWifteen of its 16 pieces have been created inside an $8,000 sec-
ond-hand Stratasys Dimension SST 3D printer, a machine that
lays down threads of melted polymer that add up to precisely-
shaped solid objects just as easily as a traditional printer lays ink
on a page. The only non-printed piece is a common hardware store
nail used as its firing pin.31
Wilson's dream is to allow anyone to print a "lethal device."32 "It's kind
of scary, but that's what we're aiming to show. Anywhere there's a computer
and an Internet connection, there would be the promise of a gun."33 The Lib-
erator's relative success caught the eye of Washington. New York Congress-
man Steve Israel responded to Defense Distributed's work by calling for a
revamping of the Undetectable Firearms Act, to be discussed presently. "Se-
curity checkpoints, background checks, and gun regulations will do little
good if criminals can print plastic firearms at home and bring those firearms
through metal detectors with no one the wiser."34
Defense Distributed is seeking to design a method that works on the
cheaper printers like "the $2,200 Replicator ... or the even cheaper, open-
source RepRap."35 These 3-D "hobby printers" sit on a desktop and are con-
trolled by a PC or a MAC and "feed[ ] a plastic 'wire' through a heated
nozzle onto a platform that shifts in concert with the nozzle building a three-
dimensional plastic object."36 These printers can go for as low as $1,200.37
Defense Distributed's project has created quite a stir. Wired, a tech publica-
tion, included Wilson in their "15 Most Dangerous People in the World"





34. Greenberg, supra note 28.
35. Id.
36. Larry N. Zimmerman, Law Practice Management Tips and Tricks, Printers Get
Interesting, Finally, 81 JAN J. KAN. B.A. 15 (Jan. 2012).
37. Id.
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technology can "circumvent laws until governments simply become
irrelevant."39
Legislation frequently has difficulty keeping up with technology.40 De-
fense Distributed's goal of bringing a 3-D printed firearm to every home is
not a stretch by any means. Congress has attempted to regulate the ownership
of undetectable firearms through the Undetectable Firearms Act, but the Act
does not mention 3-D printed firearms. Although the Act is broad, the 3-D
printing technology is taking advantage of the Act's silence as far as the
manufacturing of the weapons. Therefore, Congress needs to propose legisla-
tion that will regulate the technology in a meaningful way. One way to regu-
late the home production of a material is through the Commerce Clause.
B. The Commerce Clause-A Historical Overview
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution delegates
to Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several states. "[I]
The Congress shall have Power. . . [3] To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."' Con-
gress has used the Commerce Clause to regulate a large and diverse variety
of daily activities.42 In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall first ana-
lyzed the nature of the Commerce Clause.43 Justice Marshall argued that
there are limitations on the power, yet it "is complete in itself' and the Con-
stitution is the only acknowledged limitation.44 The "enumeration presup-
poses something not enumerated," according to the Court.45 The Court saw
its power as "exclusively internal" to the commerce of a State.46 Over the
course of time, the efforts of the Supreme Court were concentrated more on
state regulation of internal commerce. The Court would typically uphold any
state activity unless it "discriminated against or burdened interstate
commerce."47
There was a shift of focus in 1887 when Congress began to affirma-
tively regulate commerce through means such as the Interstate Commerce
39. Greenberg, supra note 28.
40. See Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law's Race to Keep Up
With Technological Change, 7 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL'Y 239, 239 (2007).
41. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8.
42. See Antony Barone Kolenc, Note, Commerce Clause Challenges After United
States v. Lopez, 50 FLA. L. REV. 867, 871 (1998) (citing Deborah J. Merrit,
Federalism as Empowerment, 47 FLA. L. REV. 541, 533 & n.69 (1995)).
43. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 189, 190 (1824).
44. Id. at 196.
45. Id. at 195.
46. Id.
47. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 11I, 121 (1942).
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Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.48 In 1905, the Commerce Clause
was used to halt price fixing in the Chicago meat industry using the Sherman
Antitrust Act. 49 In Swift & Co. v. United States, the Court found that business
done at a local level could become part of a "current of commerce among the
states," and the purchase of items such as cattle "is part and incident of such
commerce."50 In ALA Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the Court
created and implemented the direct/indirect test, which aided in "determining
how far the federal government may go in controlling intrastate transactions
upon the ground that they 'affect' interstate commerce .... "51
The Commerce Clause slowly began to expand beginning with NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.52 That Court recognized much broader grounds
upon which the Commerce Clause could regulate state activity, namely if
that activity of commerce in general had a "substantial effect" on such com-
merce.53 The National Labor Relations Act permitted workers to unionize
and participate in collective bargaining.54 Effectively, the NLRB could issue
a complaint for "unfair labor practices" that affected commerce.55 The Court
found, "[a]lthough activities may be intrastate in character when separately
considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that com-
merce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power
to exercise that control."56
With a newly expanded Commerce Clause, Congress "continued to pass
laws invoking their commerce power for the next sixty years."57 Wickard v.
Filburn sought to challenge the Commerce Clause expansion. In Wickard,
Roscoe C. Filburn took action against the Secretary of Agriculture, Claude R.
Wickard, for a marketing penalty imposed by an amendment to the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act. The penalty effected part of his 1941 wheat crop which
"was available for marketing in excess of the marketing quota established for
his farm."58 Filburn claimed that the wheat marketing quota provisions in the
48. See Kolenc, supra note 42, at 871.
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
50. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 399 (1905).
51. ALA Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935).
52. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
53. See id. at 40.
54. Id. at 22-23.
55. Id. at 24.
56. Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 37.
57. Joseph Luppino-Esposito, Four Shots at the Commerce Clause: The Firearms
Freedom Act and the Unarticulated Products Category of the Commerce
Power, 7 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 229, 235 (2010).
58. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 11, 113 (1942).
2014]
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Act were unconstitutional and not "sustainable" under the Commerce
Clause.59 Filburn had owned and operated a small farm in Ohio where he
kept dairy cattle, sold milk, raised poultry, and sold poultry and eggs. 60 He
also grew a small acreage of "winter wheat" that was sown in the fall and
harvested in the summer. 61 Part of this crop was sold, another was to feed the
poultry and cattle that he sold, some was used for home consumption, and
whatever was left was kept as seed for the next year.62
However, in July of 1940, pursuant to the Act as amended, Filburn's
1941 crop allotment was allowed 1 1.1 acres and a "normal yield of 20.1
bushels of wheat an acre."63 Although Filburn was given notice of this allot-
ment, he sowed "23 acres, and harvested from his 11.9 acres of excess acre-
age 239 bushels," which under the terms of the Act, constituted farm
marketing excess and subject to a "penalty of 49 cents a bushel, or $1 17.11
in all."64 Then the Court made an interesting distinction. The Court argued
that even though Filburn's actions did not in and of themselves "affect com-
merce," if every farmer in the country did what Filburn did then "[h]ome-
grown wheat ... competes with wheat in commerce."65 This is commonly
referred to as the "aggregate effects" test.66 The Court's decision also marked
the beginning of showing deference to congressional findings. Some rulings
did not even require any congressional findings.
The most notable, and perhaps the apex of the Commerce Clause expan-
sion was Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States. In that case, the Court
concluded that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited
racial discrimination in places of public accommodation, as applied to a
motel that serves interstate travelers, "is within the power granted [Congress]
by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, as interpreted by this Court for
140 years."67 The cases that followed "showed no practical limit on Con-
gress' power under the Commerce- Clause."68
59. Id.
60. Id. at 114.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 114.
64. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 114-15.
65. Id. at 128.
66. Id. at 127-28.
67. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964).
68. Kolenc, supra note 42, at 873 (citing Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill:
Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lo-
pez, 46 CASE W. RES. L.REv. 695, 701 (1996)).
[Vol. XVII
The Internet and Its Discontents
C. Lopez and the Modern Commerce Clause
United States v. Lopez changed everything. Before Lopez, it seemed that
Congress' Commerce power was almost unlimited. Throughout the past sev-
eral decades the Court had deferred to Congress and allowed the Commerce
Clause to continue to expand its reach. Lopez became the breaking point. In
his majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist sought to confirm that the
"outer limits" of the Commerce Clause had been reached.69
In Lopez, a 12th-grade senior high student brought a concealed .38-cali-
ber handgun and five bullets to Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas.70
Congress had previously passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,
which made it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to be-
lieve, is a school zone."71 Acting on a tip, the school authorities confronted
Lopez and he admitted that he was carrying the firearm and ammunition.72
Lopez was arrested and charged under Texas law with firearm possession on
a school premise.73
The state charges were dropped and federal agents charged respondent
with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q)(1)(A).74 A grand jury indicted Lopez with "one count of knowing
possession of a firearm at a school zone, in violation of § 922(q)."75 How-
ever, Lopez moved to dismiss the federal charge as "unconstitutional," and
argued that it was "beyond the power of Congress to legislate control over
public schools."76 Lopez waived his right to a jury trial and the District Court
found him guilty of violating § 922 (q).77 However, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed Lopez's conviction, agreeing with Lopez that "his
conviction based on . . .§ 922(q) exceeded Congress' power to legislate
under the Commerce Clause."78 Rehnquist and the majority agreed.
In his opinion, Rehnquist outlined "three broad categories" of activity
that Congress may regulate under its commerce power.79 First, Congress may
69. United States. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1995).





75. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 552.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 558.
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regulate the use of channels of interstate commerce."s0 Rehnquist, citing
Caminetti v. United States,81 recognized that "[t]he authority of Congress to
keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious
uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question."82 Sec-
ond, "Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities."83 Examples are
things such as destruction of aircraft or theft from interstate shipments.84 The
final category of "Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regu-
late those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce,
those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." 85 The proper
test for the final category requires "an analysis of whether the regulated ac-
tivity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce."86
Rehnquist believed that if § 922(q) was to be sustained, it had to fall
within the third category as "regulation of an activity that substantially af-
fects interstate commerce." 87 The Court believed that § 922(q) did not relate
to economic activity like the Agricultural Adjustment Act in Wickard.88
Where the Act in Wickard related to economic activity, § 922(q) was con-
cerned with criminal penalties.89 The Court upheld the notion that the Com-
merce Clause will continue to regulate economic activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce and "any legislation regulating that activity will
be sustained." 90 In the third category, the Court identified four major
problems with the Act. First, firearm possession had nothing to do with com-
merce. 9' Second, the Act had "no express jurisdictional element which might
limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have
an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce." 92 Third, con-
gressional findings were absent in the Act, which broke from prior firearms
80. Id.
81. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917).
82. Lopez, 514 U.S., at 558 (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491
(1917)).
83. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 558-59.
86. Id. at 559.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 561.
89. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
90. Id. at 560.
91. Id. at 561.
92. Id. at 562.
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legislation.93 Finally, the government's reasoning, if accepted, "convert[s]
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police
power of the sort retained by the States."94
Further, the Court did not overrule Jones & Laughlin Steel or Wickard.95
Instead, the Court found that § 922(q) contained "no jurisdictional element
which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm posses-
sion in question affects interstate commerce."96 Therefore, the Court, while
not overruling itself, managed to taper the expanding congressional power
through the Commerce Clause.
United States v. Morrison affirmed Lopez. In Morrison, petitioner
Christy Brzonkala alleged that she was raped and assaulted repeatedly by
Antonio Morrison and James Crawford. 97 Brzonkala claimed that the attack
caused her severe emotional distress, which caused her to eventually with-
draw from the school.98 Brzonkala eventually sued Morrison and Crawford in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia claiming
that the attack violated 42 U.S.C. § 13981 and was thus entitled civil reme-
dies.99 The District Court dismissed the suit and on appeal; the Court of Ap-
peals heard the issue en banc, and affirmed the District Court's conclusion
that "Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact § 13981's civil
remedy."100
The Court applied Lopez's four "significant considerations."10, The
Court found that § 13981 satisfied only one factor, congressional findings,
which was insufficient to uphold the Act under Congress' commerce
power. 02 The Court reasoned that the congressional findings were founded
on an argument that the Lopez court had expressly rejected, namely "that
Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Con-
stitution's distinction between national and local authority . "103 Further,
93. Id. at 563.
94. Id. at 567.
95. Luppino-Esposito, supra note 57, at 237 (citing Jim Chen, Filbum's Legacy, 52
EMORY L.J. 1719, 1733-36 (2003)).
96. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
97. See United States v. Morrison 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000).
98. See id. at 602-03.
99. Id. at 604.
100. Id. at 604-05.
101. See id. at 609-13. (significant considerations are: 1) § 922(q) was a criminal
statute and did not relate to commerce or the economy; 2) it had not jurisdic-
tional element or affect on interstate commerce; 3) there were no congressional
findings; 4) no link between possession of a firearm in a school zone and inter-
state commerce.).
102. Id. at 614-15.
103. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
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even if taken in aggregate, the Court found the Act to be outside of the scope
of the Commerce Clause and "reject[ed] the argument that Congress may
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that con-
duct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce." o4 The Court affirmed that
this type of a crime is a local activity, and maintained the distinction between
"what is truly national and what is truly local."1 05
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
"I took a little risk
Send lawyers, guns and money
Dad, get me out of this"' 106
A. The Modern Commerce Clause-Raich to present.
Lopez held its rein for a decade. Gonzales v. Raich is now considered to
be the seminal commerce power case.107 In Raich, the Court considered
whether Article I, § 8, of the Constitution in its authority, allowed Congress
to prohibit "the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with
California law."108 In 1996, California adopted the Compassionate Use Act
of 1996, which allowed the "seriously ill" residents of the State to have ac-
cess to marijuana for medical purposes. 0 9 The Act also encouraged Federal
and State Governments to take steps toward ensuring the safe and affordable
distribution of the drug to patients.110 The Act created an exemption for phy-
sicians and patients alike from criminal prosecution if they possess or culti-
vate marijuana for medicinal purposes."'
The two respondents in the case, Angel Raich and Diane Monson, both
suffered from serious medical conditions and "sought to avail themselves of
medical marijuana pursuant to the terms of the Compassionate Use Act."112
For years, both women had been using medical marijuana that had been pre-
scribed by licensed, board-certified physicians to alleviate their pain.]13 Both
women relied "heavily on cannabis to function on a daily basis."114 In fact,
104. Id. at 616-17.
105. Id. at 617-18.
106. WARREN ZEVON, LAWYERS, GUNS AND MONEY (Asylum Records 1978).
107. Luppino-Esposito, supra note 57, at 238.
108. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (2005).
109. Id. at 5-6.
110. Id. at 6.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 6-7.
113. Id. at 7.
114. Raich, 545 U.S. at 7.
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Raich's physician believed that forgoing the treatment would cause Raich
"excruciating pain and could very well prove fatal."'5 Respondent cultivated
her own marijuana, while Raich relied on her caregivers to provide her with
locally grown marijuana.116
On August 15, 2002, county deputy sheriffs and Federal Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) agents came to Monson's home."i7 The county
officials concluded that "her use of marijuana was entirely lawful .... "18
However, the DEA had a three-hour standoff, which resulted in the federal
agents destroying all six of Monson's marijuana plants.119 The respondents
sought injunctive and declaratory relief that would prohibit the enforcement
of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) "to the extent it prevents them from
possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing cannabis for their personal medical
use."120 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, found the CSA to be Con-
stitutional, calling the statute "comprehensive" and "provid[ing] meaningful
regulation over legitimate sources of drugs to prevent diversion into illegal
channels .... "12 The Court likened the situation to Wickard, and reiterated
that "even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."22 The Court
further noted that it "need not determine whether respondents' activities,
taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but
only whether a 'rational basis' exists for so concluding."123 The Court found
CSA to be "necessary and proper" to regulate commerce and accomplish
Congress' goal of curbing the criminal drug market.124 The Court declared
"[t]hat the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of not mo-
ment. As we have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual
components of that larger scheme."125
Further, the Court distinguished § 922(q) (the Gun Free School Zones
Act) from the CSA, stating "[t]he Act (§ 922(q)) did not contain any require-




118. Id. at 7.
119. Id.
120. Raich, 545 U.S. at 8.
121. Id. at 10.
122. Id. at 17.
123. Id. at 22 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557).
124. Id. at 22.
125. Id.
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ity or a predictable impact on future commercial activity."26 Here, however,
the "statutory scheme that the Government is defending (CSA) is at the op-
posite end of the regulatory spectrum."27 The Court reasoned that
"[p]rohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of com-
merce is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce
in that product."128 The Court concluded by reminding the respondents that
Congress can regulate things as conceptually simple as supply and demand
issues: "One need not have a degree in economics to understand why a na-
tionwide exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana (or other drugs) locally
cultivated for personal use may have a substantial impact on the interstate
market ... ."129 Therefore, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's injunction
and affirmed that Congress can criminalize wholly intrastate conduct even in
Lopez's Third Category cases.
Raich appears to allow federal regulation of "wholly intrastate conduct
in some Lopez Third Category cases. Certainly its invocation of the rational
basis test-entirely absent from Lopez and Morrison-provides fresh hope
to proponents of federal criminal enforcement."]30 Raich effectively explores
the language of Lopez and Morrison and "assesses the validity of [the] Lopez
Third Category statutes solely be reference to whether or not the conduct
they regulate is properly characterized as 'economic.'"131 Thus, the Lopez
Third Category is isolated, while the other two categories are "set aside" as
"distinct" as they do not raise the same federalism concerns. 32
The Lopez Third Category is, without a doubt, the primary focus of all
modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence.133 The Court has not had occasion
to "address directly the constitutionality of any First or Second Category stat-
ute."'134 The Lopez line of cases exempts any First and Second Category stat-
utes from the economic/non-economic analysis used in the Third Category. 135
Yet, federalist scholars have a difficult time accepting this limitation:
• ..[S]cholars and criminal defense lawyers alike have sought to
extend Lopez's principles to First and Second Category cases, ar-
126. Id. at 23.
127. Id. at 24.
128. Id. at 26.
129. Id. at 28.
130. Michele Martinez Campbell, The Kids are Online: The Internet, The Com-
merce Clause, and the Amended Federal Kidnapping Act, 14 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 215, 234 (2011).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Campbell, supra note 130, at 234.
134. Id. at 234-35.
135. Id. at 235.
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guing that Lopez should be construed to place any and all intra-
state, violent, noneconomic crime beyond the power of Congress
to regulate regardless of its impact on the facilities or channels of
commerce. 136
Arguably, these concerns find their genesis in Justice Breyer's dissent in
Morrison. Breyer found the majority's economic/noneconomic distinction
"unworkable."137 "[I]n a world where most everyday products or their com-
ponent parts cross interstate boundaries, Congress will frequently find it pos-
sible to redraft a statute using language that ties the regulation to the
interstate movement of some relevant object, thereby regulating local crimi-
nal activity .... ."38 In essence, Justice Breyer noted that the economic/
noneconomic distinction was meaningless and argued that such "murkiness
called out for a rational-basis standard of review that would have Congress,
rather than the Court, draw these difficult lines."139 Though Breyer's dissent
has molded the way scholars think about the Commerce Clause in relation to
various Third Category statutes, it has not permeated Congress' decision
making or drafting as of yet. This will become particularly clear in the real
life example of the Internet and 3-D printing technology.
B. The Internet and the Stream of Commerce
The Internet raises some profound questions about the relationship be-
tween the many states and the federal government. The Internet is without
border. It affects most aspects of our daily lives from communication to fi-
nancial transactions to travel. According to a recent Pew Internet and Ameri-
can Life Project study, nearly 85% of Americans are online.140 The number
of people who have Internet in their homes is slightly lower-72%.141 How-
ever, it is indisputable that the Internet has a profound impact on our society,
both economically and non-economically. In fact, several courts have argued
that the Internet is an instrumentality of interstate commerce. The impact of
this analysis reveals that the Internet must be recognized as an "instrumental-
ity" and subject to regulation and Commerce Clause considerations.
In American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, the plaintiffs:
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 235-36 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 659 (2000)
(Breyer, J., dissenting)).
139. Campbell, supra note 130, at 236.
140. Caitlin Dewey, The 60 Million Americans Who Don't Use the Internet, in Six
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"represent[ed] a spectrum of individuals and organizations who
use the Internet to communicate, disseminate, display, and access
a broad range of communications ... including American Library
Association . . .. American Booksellers Foundation for Free Ex-
pression ... Association of American Publishers ... Bibliobytes
. . . Interactive Digital Software Association . . . American Civil
Liberties Union . 1..."142
The defendants were the Governor and Attorney General of New
York.143 The plaintiffs sought to challenge the New York Penal Law
§ 235.21 (the Act) which sought to criminalize the communication and distri-
bution of "nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse, . . ." to mi-
nors. 144 The court argued that the "Internet is a decentralized, global
communications medium linking people, institutions, corporations, and gov-
ernments all across the world."'45 The court described the Internet as a "net-
work or networks" that was "capable of rapidly transmitting communications
without direct human involvement or control."146 The information on the In-
ternet is "as diverse as human thought."' 47 The diversity of human thought
carries the good and the bad.
Access to the Internet is available through a number of avenues. "Stu-
dents and faculty often obtain access via their educational institutions; simi-
larly some corporations provide their employees with direct ... access to the
Internet. Individuals ... can access the Internet via a community network or
a local library that provides direct or modem access ... "148 Now people can
access the Internet via cellular phone networks and residential and commer-
cial wi-fi hotspots.
The court makes a salient argument about the nature of the Internet and
its connection to interstate commerce by finding the Act in violation of the
Commerce Clause:
The Internet is wholly insensitive to geographic distinctions. In
almost every case, users of the Internet neither know nor care
about the physical location of the Internet resources they access
.... The majority of the Internet addresses contain no geographic
clues and, even where an Internet address provides such a clue, it
may be misleading .... Moreover, no aspect of the Internet can
feasibly be closed off to users from another state. An Internet user
142. American Libraries Ass'n v.Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160,161-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
143. Id. at 163.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 164.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 164.
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who posts a Web page cannot prevent New Yorkers or
Oklahomans or Iowans from accessing that page and will not even
know from what state visitors to that site hail. Nor can a partici-
pant in a chat room prevent other participants from a particular
state from joining the conversation . . . .Commercial use of the
Internet, moreover, is a growing phenomenon . . . .In addition,
many of those users who are communicating for private, noncom-
mercial purposes are nonetheless participants in interstate com-
merce by virtue of their Internet consumption. Many users obtain
access to the Internet by means of an on-line service provider...
which charges a fee for its services .... The inescapable conclu-
sion is that the Internet represents an instrument of interstate com-
merce, albeit an innovative one; the novelty of the technology
should not obscure the fact that regulation of the Internet impels
traditional Commerce Clause considerations. 149
The court concluded, "the Act places undue burden on interstate traffic,
whether the traffic be goods, services, or ideas."150 However, the impact of
the court's decision reaches far beyond the New York Penal Law § 235.21.
The court effectively bridged the Internet and Commerce Clause together,
and acknowledged that the Internet must be looked at through the Commerce
Clause lens because it recognizes no borders, is accessible to almost every-
one, and carries with it ideas, goods, and services. Many courts have shared
the holding in Pataki, mostly courts considering child pornography issues.
For example, in United States v. Penton, an 11 th Circuit case, the court held
that the government's evidence "was sufficient to establish the interstate
commerce element of each of the crimes" when they showed evidence that
Penton showed child pornography to a minor.15 Penton had stored and dis-
played the indecent material on a computer and the computer, which was
built from parts manufactured outside of the United States.152 The court also
noted that it "is well-settled that the Internet [sic] is an instrumentality of
interstate commerce."153
In United States. v. Faris, an 11 th Circuit case, the court acknowledged
that the Internet was an instrumentality of interstate commerce even when the
purposes of the use are primarily intrastate.154 The court reasoned, "[e]ven if
none of Faris' communications were routed over state lines, the internet and
telephone he used to contact the undercover officer were still 'instrumentali-
149.'Id. at 170-73.
150. Id. at 173.
151. U.S. v. Penton, 380 Fed. Appx. 818, 820 (11 th Cir. 2010) (For a full treatment
of this issue, see Cambell, supra note 130, at 234).
152. Penton, 380 Fed. Appx. at 820.
153. Id.
154. See United States v. Faris, 583 F.3d 756, 759 (2009).
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ties of interstate commerce."' Therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), which prohib-
its using a facility of interstate commerce to entice a minor to engage in
sexual activity, does not violate the Commerce Clause.155
In United States v. Lane, another 11 th Circuit case, the court found that
"Congress clearly has the power to regulate the internet, as it does other
instrumentalities and channels of interstate commerce, and to prohibit its use
for harmful or immoral purposes regardless of whether those purposes would
have a primarily intrastate impact."56 Lane cited United States v. Hornaday,
which pointed out that the Commerce Clause power is plenary and Congress
"may reach and prohibit the use of telephone or the internet .... The com-
munication does not have to be directly with the victim."157 The court also
dismissed Hornaday's argument that 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) punished him for
exercising free speech activities protected by the First Amendment, noting
that "[s]peech attempting to arrange the sexual abuse of children is no more
constitutionally protected than speech attempting to arrange any other type of
crime."5 8 The Hornaday court essentially reasoned that the Internet is an
instrumentality of interstate commerce and Congress can regulate it regard-
less of whether the use is fundamentally intrastate.
Finally, in United States v. Trotter, the court reasoned that "[tjhe In-
ternet is an international network of interconnected computers and is compa-
rable to 'a sprawling mall offering goods and services."'159 Computers,
according to the court, are "both the means to engage in commerce and the
method by which transactions occur . . ." and are thus instrumentalities of
commerce and a channel of interstate commerce."60
Pataki and the decisions that followed all point to the fact that the In-
ternet is both an instrumentality of commerce and a channel of interstate
commerce. This is significant because it allows Congress to regulate the me-
dium in which so many conduct everyday transactions. Further, if Congress
can regulate the Internet to prohibit immoral or harmful use of the "channel"
the door opens for regulatory Big-Brotherness to take hold. While the regula-
tion and prohibition of child pornography will have few dissenters, the regu-
lation of designs of 3-D plastic guns available via a website may find
passionate dissent among gun rights advocates and small government sup-
porters alike.
155. Id.
156. United States v. Lane, No. 06-11886, 2006 WL 2711939, at *2 (11th Cir. Sept.
22, 2006).
157. United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (2004).
158. Id.
159. United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997)).
160. Id. at 921.
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C. The Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988
The Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988 reads:
(a) PROHIBITIONS.-Section 922 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: "(p)(l) It
shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, import, sell, ship
deliver, possess, transfer, or receive any firearm-"(A) that, after
removal of grips, stocks, and magazines, is not as detectable as the
Security Exemplar, by walk-through metal detectors calibrated
and operated to detect the Security Exemplar; or (B) any major
component of which, when subjected to inspection by the types of
x-ray machines commonly used at airports, does not generate an
image that accurately depicts the shape of the component. Barium
sulfate or other compounds may be used in the fabrication of the
component. 161
Section (p) of the Undetectable Firearms Act (the Act) is the overarch-
ing guideline that all firearms must meet to be legal. Most of the discussion
about the Act revolves around Second Amendment issues and the Act itself
is usually a side comment. In fact, many articles have been dedicated to 3-D
printed guns and potential effects on individual rights.162
The Act is typically taken as a whole and used in a wide variety of ways
to regulate unlawful use or possession of firearms. For example, in an East-
ern District of New York case, the defendant was caught with an inoperable
firearm after fleeing police.163 The gun was "no more effective . . . than a
water gun."164 Section 922(p) was used to define a firearm grip.165 Despite
the ineffectiveness of his firearm, the defendant was sentenced to 15 years in
prison. 166
The Act was recently up for renewal and amendment in part because of
the video posted by Defense Distributed.67 The U.S. Senate addressed con-
161. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (p)(l) (2012).
162. See Kathi Cover, Gun-Free School Zones are Unconstitutional. United States
v. Lopez, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 515 (1995); Julian J. Johnson, Print, Lock, and
Load: 3-D Printers, Creation of Guns, and the Potential Threat to Fourth
Amendment Rights, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 337 (2013); Peter Jensen-
Haxel, 3D Printers, Obsolete Firearm Supply Controls, and the Right to Build
Self-Defense Weapons Under Heller, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 447 (2012).
163. Rivera v. United States, No. IlI-CV-969-ILG, 2011 WL 5858089, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2011).
164. Id.
165. Id. at n.l.
166. Id. at *1.
167. See Keith Wagstaff, Despite Plastic Gun Ban, 3-D Printed Firearms Still Have
a Future, NBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2013 at 8:02 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
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cerns about criminals' ability to arm themselves with a simple [Control + Alt
+ P]. The legislation "continues the ban on the sale or possession of firearms
that aren't detectable by X-ray machines or metal detectors .... 168 The idea
is that 3-D printed guns will fall into that category, and will regulate the new
technology under the old Act.
IV. AN INEVITABLE PROBLEM AND Two POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. An Inevitable Problem
Technology is both a solution and a problem. Advancements in technol-
ogy are typically offered as a solution to a problem. Whether the problem is
how to travel from point A to point B, how to lift X from here to there, or
simply how to cure boredom, technology seeks to answer the question of
"How?" How do we do this more efficiently? How can we cross the Atlantic
more quickly? Typically, technology does not have to ask permission either.
Someone invents something and later society decides whether everyone
should have it, whether it should be restricted, or whether it should be out-
lawed. History gives us many examples: the gin mill, the machine gun, and
the automobile.
Society, and the law that governs it, is usually reactionary. The law re-
acts to the advancement in technology, deciding whether or not it is socially,
morally, or legally acceptable. The only category that is dispositive is
whether or not something is legally acceptable. Social and moral acceptabil-
ity can provide for interesting discussions and perhaps even persuade
lawmakers, but inventions that promote things that are socially or morally
unacceptable may still find legal support.
This brings up the question of what to do with the prospect of printing a
3-D, fully plastic firearm on a printer that anyone can own? The CAD plans
are available and distributed on the Internet and the raw materials are very
inexpensive. The printers, as noted above, are relatively affordable and be-
coming more so as the technology advances. Combine the ease of design
with the affordability of the materials and technology, and Cody Wilson's
dream of everyone in America having access to these weapons is not far-
fetched.169
This proposes a two-fold problem: (1) Is the current law (The Undetect-
able Firearms Act of 1988) capable of regulating this growing field of tech-
nology? and (2) If not, then how can it be regulated? As to the first question,
I posit that it is not. The current law is outdated, overly-broad, and fails to




169. See Greenberg, supra note 28.
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regulation does not focus so much on the gun, but rather on the access to the
design via the Internet.
The second answer (the solution) is controversial and the regulation of
the Internet in this capacity would need to be parsed out very carefully. This
Comment does not seek to propose legislation, but rather prove that it can be
justifiably done through the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause itself
offers two different solutions: the first is regulation of the Internet as stream
of commerce; the second is using a Wickard analysis to justify regulation of
purely intrastate activities that substantially impact the stream of commerce.
As will be discussed presently, the current Act is not sufficient to regulate
this growing technological trend. While the regulation of the Internet and the
restriction of information may seem a tad Big Brother, the Commerce Clause
and current common law are poised to allow Congress to do so. The only real
unknown is how the law will react to the solution technology provided.
B. The Act and Its Shortcomings
The Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988 is obsolete as it reads. The Act
requires that every gun manufactured must contain barium sulfate and take
the form of something looking like a firearm if it were to go through an x-ray
machine like the ones in airports. Clearly, the Act deals more with manufac-
turers and less with any ill-willed possessors of the firearms who want to
remove the barium sulfate to escape detection. But the Act does not articulate
much outside of these two requirements. It does not ban printing your own
firearms out of plastic. A home manufacturer could easily place a piece of
barium sulfate into a plastic firearm to meet the requirement. There are two
issues with the Act. The first concerns its focus and the second concerns its
future.
The Act's focus is on the weapon after it has been manufactured. The
gun is made and it better look like a gun and it better have a piece of metal in
it large enough to set off a metal detector. For most guns this is not an issue.
The majority of the gun is made out of metal, the bullets have metal casing,
and the firing pin is metal. A 3-D printed firearm is only slightly different:
the bullets have metal cases, the firing pin must be metal, and everything else
is plastic. As Representative Steve Israel, D-N.Y. said, "In 1988, when we
passed the Undetectable Firearms Act, the notion of a 3-D printed plastic
firearm slipped through metal detectors, onto our planes in secure environ-
ments was a matter of science fiction."170 However, the problem is now a
reality. Some Democratic senators pushed for stricter controls including "3-D
printed guns having permanent metal components,"171 obviously foreseeing
the ability of manufacturers to easily remove the metal strips. In the end,
however, the Act was simply renewed, thus the regulations for 3-D printed
firearms are the same today as it was when the Act was passed.
170. Wagstaff, supra note 167.
171. Id.
2014]
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
For pioneers in this area of technology like Cody Wilson, Congress'
inability to change the Act is both good and bad, "[a]s the technology is
adopted and gets more popular, it looks like 3-D printed guns have a future
now .... I'm still expecting more restrictions as a result of this law being
passed."172 However, the focus of this particular regulation is not on how to
control the technology, but rather, what to do with the firearm once it has
been printed. This focus is a fundamental flaw that opens a huge can of
societal worms known as the Second Amendment.
The Second Amendment is hotly contested and is becoming more so
with each new tragedy. Whether it is the unthinkable event that occurred at
the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut in 2012 or the
shooting in a theater in Aurora, Colorado, it seems both sides dig in a little
deeper. Analyzing the merits of the Second Amendment and an individual's
right to own and possess a firearm are outside the scope of this comment.
The issue that remains relevant to 3-D printing technology is the focus of the
Act. The focus is on the gun after it is made, not on how it is obtained. This
is a major shortcoming of the Act and is the reason it is not a major threat to
the technology as it is.
Further, the future of the Act is may be in question following the Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller decision which could be interpreted to "support a
general right of individuals to manufacture their own firearms."73 In Heller,
the Court analyzed whether the District of Columbia's prohibition on the
possession of a usable handgun in the home was a violation of the Second
Amendment.174 The law required residents to "keep their lawfully owned
firearms, such as registered long guns, 'unloaded and disassembled or bound
by a trigger lock or similar device' unless they are located in a place of
business or are being used for lawful recreational activities."175 The Court
turned its attention to the Second Amendment and its natural division into
prefatory and operative clauses.176 Justice Scalia reasoned that the prefatory
clause did not limit the operative clause grammatically, "but rather an-
nounces a purpose."' 177 According to Scalia, the amendment could be reor-
dered to read, "Because a well regulated Militia is necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be
172. Id.
173. Peter Jensen-Haxel, 3D Printers, Obsolete Firearm Supply Controls, and the
Right to Build Self-Defense Weapons Under Heller, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
Rev. 447, 474 (2012).
174. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008).
175. Id. at 575.
176. Id. at 577.
177. Id.
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infringed."178 Scalia believed that the operative clause codified "the right of
the people" meaning that the right is an individual right.79
However, Justice Scalia's opinion had some tacit implications for the
future of gun regulation. The holding of the case is relatively narrow: citizens
can possess firearms in their homes. The dicta, on the other hand, is expan-
sive. For example, Scalia's opinion seems to extend protection to modern
firearms. Scalia makes the analogy, "[j]ust as the First Amendment protects
modern forms of communications, and the Fourth Amendment applies to
modern forms of search, the Second Amendment extends, prima facie to all
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in exis-
tence at the time of the founding."80 Some have argued that this can be
interpreted to support "a general right of individuals to manufacture their
own firearms."181 Under Heller's own historical analysis, "home-manufac-
ture is not among the 'presumptively lawful' exceptions to Second Amend-
ment protection and indeed appears to be supported in our nation's
tradition."182
Further, under Heller's "longstanding prohibitions," home manufacture
for protection is not excluded. 183 The list of exceptions is not exhaustive, yet
"no regulation, longstanding or otherwise, has controlled personal firearm
manufacture." Also, "personal manufacture remains almost entirely unregu-
lated. Specifically, Congress has always defined a firearm 'manufacturer' as
one who operates for 'the principal objective of livelihood and profit."s184
Therefore, if the Undetectable Firearm Act of 1988 seeks to regulate 3-
D printed firearms, the Supreme Court and stare decisis may have left home-
manufactured firearms on the table. The Act clearly does not focus on the
manufacture of the firearms, but rather their makeup once produced. Moreo-
ver, if Heller is interpreted to support the right of home-manufactured fire-
arms, then the advent of 3-D printed plastic firearms appears to raise
significant issues for Congress seeking to regulate the technology.
C. The Commerce Clause, Internet, and 3-D Printing of Plastic
Firearm Regulation
Legislation has typically struggled to keep pace with technology. It is no
different with 3-D printing of firearms. As shown above, Congress attempted
to address the issue through the Undetectable Firearms Act but has failed.
This leaves Congress with a problem and no solution. If the current Act can-
178. Id.
179. Id. at 578.
180. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582.
181. Jensen-Haxel, supra note 162, at 474.
182. Id. at 475.
183. Id. at 479.
184. Id.
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not regulate 3-D printed plastic firearms, then Congress will need to look to
the Commerce Clause to do so. However, passing legislation to regulate fire-
arms is a difficult task, especially with the strong lobbying presence of the
National Rifle Association. However, there are two possible solutions that
would allow Congress to regulate the new technology without encroaching
on the Second Amendment and an individual's right to own and possess a
firearm. Both solutions rely on the Commerce Clause.
The first solution is to regulate the Internet through the Lopez stream of
commerce analysis. 3-D printed firearms rely heavily on a home-manufac-
turer being able to access designs online. Therefore, by making an analogous
argument to some Internet regulations that already exist, it is to regulate and
restrict the ability to access the designs for the average Internet consumer.
The second solution requires a Wickard analysis. 3-D printers are easily
accessible and relatively affordable. One can imagine the day that the 3-D
printer becomes as common a household electronic as the current printer is
today. Much like the farmer who withheld grain for his own consumption, a
home-manufacturer of 3-D printed plastic firearms could significantly impact
the stream of commerce. The gun industry is a $33 billion industry. If the
technology were widely available and allowed anyone to print his or her own
firearms, then the gun industry could be dramatically affected if the home
manufacturing is taken in the aggregate.
Both of these solutions are plausible under the current interpretation of
the Commerce Clause by the Supreme Court. While it is unclear whether
Congress will (or can) come up with a solution given its inability to make a
simple amendment to the Undetectable Firearms Act, there is no doubt that
3-D printing will continue to be at the forefront of the political and legal
conversation going forward.
i. The Internet and its Discontents
The first solution to the inevitable problem of home manufactured, 3-D
printed firearms is to regulate access to the information online. As discussed
above, potential manufacturers can access the CAD designs online and print
the firearm. Access to the type of information that could lead to access to a
deadly weapon, raises concerns about Internet safety. Congress has already
shown the ability to regulate aspects of the Internet that violate moral or
societal mores. A prime example of this is the Adam Walsh Act,185 which
seeks to protect children from sexual exploitation. Examples like the Adam
Walsh Act could provide a template as well as a precedent for Congress to
use its Commerce Clause power to regulate access to 3-D firearm CAD
designs.
Title II of the Adam Walsh Act "contains numerous provisions amend-
ing existing federal crimes to address gaps and enhance penalties, all in the
185. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
120 Stat. 587, 587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-16917 (2006)).
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interest of protecting children, but with a determined and specific focus on
Internet safety."186 Campbell focuses on Title II, § 213, entitled "Kidnapping
Jurisdiction." Title II, according to Campbell, "amended 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(1) to create the expanded federal jurisdiction at issue ... Specifi-
cally, Title II, § 213 of the Adam Walsh Act amended the Federal Kidnap-
ping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)."187 The new 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l) reads:
"Section 1201 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-(]) in subsection
(a)(]), by striking 'if the person was alive when the transportation began' and
inserting 'or the offender travels in interstate ... commerce or uses the mail
or any means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate ... commerce in com-
mitting or in furtherance of the commission of the offense . 1...'"88 The most
significant change to existing federal jurisdiction in kidnapping cases is the
addition of federal jurisdiction over kidnappings "in which the perpetrator
uses facilities or instrumentalities of interstate commerce in committing or in
furtherance of the crime."189 For the purposes of this Comment and Camp-
bell's article, the instrumentality is the Internet. As Campbell points out,
Congress's concern with the Internet safety "arose out of a legitimate federal
interest: the need to keep the important economic tool of the Internet safe for
use, rather than having it subverted by sexual predators who take advantage
of its anonymity to lure child victims."190 The Adam Walsh Act provides an
important example of Congress's identification of the societal threat of child
predation through the Internet, and using the Commerce Clause, more specif-
ically the Lopez Second Category, to regulate the issue.
The Internet is a clear instrumentality of interstate commerce. The ques-
tion is whether Congress should regulate access to 3-D firearm CAD designs.
The answer to this question will be highly charged politically and is outside
the scope of this Comment. However, with approximately thirty-two mass
shootings since Columbine,191 the idea that firearms can simply be printed in
a person's living room regardless of age or mental wellness demands a seri-
ous look at the possibility of regulation. Answering in the affirmative would
require drawing an analogy to other instances in which Congress has regu-
lated the Internet, such as the Adam Walsh Act. However, would Congress
be stretching the limits of its Commerce Clause power by regulating 3-D
186. Campbell, supra note 130, at 239.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing 120 Stat. at 616 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l) (2006))).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 240.
191. See School Shootings Since Columbine High Massacre, THE DENVER POST
(Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_24721063/school-shoot-
ings-since-columbine-high-massacre.; see also A History of Mass Shootings in
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printed firearms? A line must be drawn somewhere. While using the Com-
merce Clause to protect children from online predators should raise few ob-
jections from a societal interest standpoint, doing so to regulate access to
firearms will be far more controversial.
Whether or not Congress should regulate 3-D printed firearms is a de-
bate for another time. The question of whether or not Congress can regulate
firearms is a little clearer. Drawing from the Adam Walsh Act and the Ameri-
can Library Ass'n v. Pataki decision, Congress and the Supreme Court indi-
cated that the Internet is fair game for Commerce Clause regulation. The
Second Category of the Lopez analysis opens the door for Congress to enact
legislation that regulates and protects the "instrumentalities" of interstate
commerce, even if the threat only comes from intrastate activities.92 Thus,
even if a CAD design was created by the manufacturer and then printed on a
3-D printer at his or her own home, the production of the firearm involves an
"instrumentality" and can be regulated. The Lopez decision is broad in this
sense and allows the Court and Congress significant leeway in deciding
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. As the Pataki decision noted, "[t]he ines-
capable conclusion is that the Internet represents an instrument of interstate
commerce, albeit an innovative one; the novelty of the technology should not
obscure the fact that regulation of the Internet impels traditional Commerce
Clause considerations."193 The 3-D printing technology is here and, although
novel, should not obscure the need for a traditional Commerce Clause con-
sideration. The question of whether or not Congress can regulate Internet
access to 3-D printed firearm designs is answered by conducting a Lopez
analysis. Congress has already used Lopez's Second Category to regulate the
Internet in a child predation situation through the Adam Walsh Act. There-
fore, Congress could do the same with 3-D printed firearm design on the
premise of protecting and regulating the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce.
Further, regulating access to the information via the Internet could also
help avoid any Second Amendment issues that may arise. The Second
Amendment gives people the right to keep and bear arms. 194 The amendment
reads, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed."95 The Heller decision interpreted the Second Amendment as giving
an individual the right to keep and possess a firearm in his or her home. 3-D
printing of firearms at home, which would proliferate access and ownership,
creates a noticeable tension between the Supreme Court's decision in Heller
and Congress's desire to regulate the technology. This tension is likely to
draw the attention of lobbying groups such as the National Rifle Association.
192. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
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Interestingly, however, the NRA was silent during Congress's deliberations
about the Undetectable Firearms Act. This could be because the NRA real-
ized that Congress was not going to be able to amend the act in any meaning-
ful way and therefore decided to let nature run its course. Or, perhaps the
silence was a sign of something else.
The NRA identifies itself as "America's longest-standing civil rights
organization ... [and] proud defenders of history's patriots and diligent pro-
tectors of the Second Amendment."96 One would think that the advent of
this new technology would garner support from the NRA to groups like De-
fense Distributed. However, "the development of new 3-D technology that
could dramatically increase the number of available weapons-and competi-
tion to gun manufacturers-these two competing pressures are at odds."' 197
As Joshua Sager points out, "[T]he NRA faces a test: Will it back the new
technology and promote the rights of everyone to have unlimited guns? Or,
in an effort to protect its generous contributors, chart a different path?"198
The NRA, "takes millions of dollars a year from the largest manufacturers of
guns, including Beretta and Benelli USA, as well as companies that make
gun accessories and companies that require easy access to weapons .... "199
Will the NRA back the individual's right to greater access to guns, or will the
NRA feel the pressure of its pocketbook? Backing any legislation that regu-
lates access to the information could come across as reasonable by showing
that the NRA is "willing to compromise" on gun control.200 Also, by attack-
ing the access to the CAD designs on the Internet, both Congress and the
NRA can effectively avoid a Second Amendment argument. The NRA saves
face and Congress avoids dealing with the NRA's strong arm.
Therefore, while gun control is a contested topic in the United States
and 3-D printing seems to be able to put greater access to a larger arsenal into
the hands of every individual, regulating access via the Internet could allow
Congress an avenue to restrict a potentially dangerous technological ad-
vancement without treading upon the Second Amendment. Further, groups
like the NRA may see great benefit in supporting such legislation because of
the potentially damaging effect it would have on their bottom line.
ii. An Aggregate Effect: The Farmer's Market
Another possible outlet for Congress to exercise its Commerce Clause
power is through a Wickard analysis. One of the main draws of 3-D printing
technology is the ability to print things like firearms at home. 3-D printing
technology turns the consumer into the manufacturer and allows an individ-
196. NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, http://home.nra.org/home/list/home-feature.
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ual to create and produce nearly anything imaginable. For instance, the UK-
based company, PrinterInks, has teamed up with Organovo to print func-
tional human tissue for medical research and therapeutic applications.201 Ob-
viously, home manufacturing of human organs is far-fetched and not
incredibly useful to the average consumer, but the fact that it is possible
illustrates the far-reaching capabilities of this technology. 3-D printing of
firearms also could greatly negatively affect the $33 billion gun industry,
much like the Supreme Court found Filburn's personal crops affected the
agricultural industry.
The gun industry in America is enormous. In aggregate, the industry
supports approximately 220,000 jobs, which is more than twice as many as
corporate giant General Motors.202 The gun industry is made up of thousands
of small businesses and a few giant corporations like Smith & Wesson and
Remington.203 These thousands of small businesses are divided across the
country and provide jobs in every state in the Union. Idaho's economy, for
example, benefits enormously from the gun industry as it is home to one of
the largest ammunition manufacturers in the United States-ATK Sport-
ing.204 Idaho's firearm businesses bring in an estimated $512.7 million in
revenue each year and provide 3,116 jobs.205 Nationally, the number of those
employed by the gun industry grew by more than 10% from 2008 to 2010.206
In 2012, the gun industry was estimated to be worth $33 billion dollars with
$5 billion in tax revenues to the federal government. 207 For Texas, the eco-
nomic contribution of the gun and ammunition industry is an incredible
$2,213,737,414, making it the second highest grossing state for that industry
behind California's $3,798,233,534.208
The reason this industry is so enormous is the fact that 47% of Ameri-
can adults own at least one firearm in their home or property. 20 9 America's
gun industry consists of 5,441 makers, 1,895 manufacturers of ammunition,
201. Rhiannon Williams, The Next Step: 3D Printing the Human Body, TELEGRAPH
(Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/10629531I/The-
next-step-3D-printing-the-human-body.html.
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48,676 dealers, 7,075 pawnbrokers, 59,227 collectors, and 811 importers.210
Further, most guns made in the United States are sold in the United States Of
the 6.54 million guns produced in 2011, only 296,888 were sold in export
markets.211 Compare this with other industries, such as the automobile indus-
try, where a manufacturer like GM who sells only 30% of the automobiles
produced in the United States.212 In all, from 1986 to 2011 some 2,228
United States companies produced more than 106 million firearms.213 Thus,
while economic titans, like ExxonMobil, which generated $450 billion in
2012 overshadow the gun industry, it is still a significant percentage of the
U.S. economy and creates a large number of jobs in each state.
The advent of 3-D printed firearms stands to jeopardize the flourishing
gun industry. Congress has a strong interest in protecting important economic
industries like the auto industry, the firearm industry, and the agricultural
industry. And much like the Agricultural Adjustment Act in Wickard v. Fil-
burn, Congress will want to protect the gun industry by regulating consum-
ers' ability to manufacture their own firearms. The Court there noted that
Filburn's actions did not in and of themselves "affect commerce," but if
every farmer did the same thing then "[h]ome-grown wheat ...competes
with wheat in commerce."214 It would also be unfair to penalize those who
did not grow wheat by forcing them into the market and allowing those who
did grow wheat to be immune from having to participate in that same mar-
ket.215 The Court also noted, "[t]he conflicts of economic interest between the
regulated and those who advantage by it are wisely left under our system to
resolution by the Congress under its more flexible and responsible legislative
process."216 Thus, if Congress believed that the gun industry were truly at
risk from the potential proliferation of home-manufactured firearms, then
Filburn would provide a clear precedent for Congress to act.
Of course, wheat crops and firearms are different. Some could argue
that the Agricultural Adjustment Act merely penalized excess wheat stocks,
but did not outlaw it. To outlaw the home manufacturing of firearms is there-
fore not analogous to the Filburn decision, it instead stretches it too far.
However, this criticism lacks certain muster when seen in the bigger picture
of the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause has been interpreted to pro-
tect and regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. The Filburn
decision used an aggregate effects analysis, which forced the Court and, in
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the market, Congress must make a decision as to what is regulated and who
is allowed to take advantage of that regulation. Here, in the instance of 3-D
printed firearms, which threaten to upend a $33 billion industry, Congress
has precedent to consider the technology's aggregate effect on the entire
stream of commerce. Doing so would likely lead Congress to prohibit home
manufacturing of firearms through 3-D printing. Congress may permit cer-
tain people to manufacture firearms with a permit and under certain circum-
stances, but it is unlikely that Congress will allow the technology to go
unchecked. As the Filburn decision reveals, Congress has the power and the
interest to regulate and protect the gun industry by limiting access to the
technology.
Therefore, Filburn lays the ground work for Congress to regulate the 3-
D printing of firearm's industry through its aggregate effects analysis. While
it will be contested, the Supreme Court seemingly has given Congress the
power to protect the stream of commerce by considering the overall effect an
action will have on a given industry. Filburn remains good law and bestows
on Congress the ability to restrain the ability to manufacture a firearm
through 3-D printing in one's own living room by regulating access. How
Congress chooses to protect the gun industry remains to be seen. It will not
likely be a complete prohibition, but rather a permit and registration require-
ment that is steep in cost and severe in penalty if broken.
V. CONCLUSION
3-D printing technology is quickly advancing in many directions. One
direction is the ability to manufacture a firearm in one's living room. Groups
like Defense Distributed have declared it their goal to bring the ability to
print a fully functional plastic firearm to every home in America. With the 3-
D printers becoming reasonably affordable, Defense Distributed's goal is not
far-fetched. Unfortunately, Congress missed on its first swipe at addressing
the potential security risk the technology poses. The Undetectable Firearms
Act of 1984 is inadequate as it currently reads to properly regulate the emerg-
ing technology. Additionally; the Act does not address the potential eco-
nomic impact home manufacturing could have on the gun industry.
Therefore, the solution from Congress will need to address the technology
head on through the Commerce Clause. There is a clear precedent from the
Supreme Court that allows Congress the power to protect and regulate the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Congress must act in order to keep
up with emerging technologies, especially when they pose significant eco-
nomic threats.
The first avenue for Congress to consider is to regulate access to the
information on the Internet. In American Library Ass'n v. Pataki the court
made a compelling argument for the Internet to be subject to regulation just
like any other instrumentality of commerce. Essentially, the Internet substan-
tially affects the stream of commerce by being a major source of transactions
of economic and informational value. Therefore, the Internet falls under the
Lopez Second Category analysis. Because the Internet substantially affects
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the stream of commerce, it thus falls within the zone of Congress's Com-
merce Clause jurisdiction. While arguments that the Internet should be regu-
lated in any uniform way has yet to be made in the nation's highest court,
Congress has already done so in certain circumstances like kidnapping or
child pornography.
The second avenue for Congress to consider is to use an aggregated
effects analysis as provided in Wickard v. Filburn. The gun industry is a $33
billion industry that employs a significant number of people in each state. 3-
D printing technology could jeopardize the industry if, in aggregate, the tech-
nology transformed the consumer into a manufacturer of firearms. If the
technology becomes as accessible as projected, then this is a likely outcome.
As noted, 47% of Americans own at least one firearm. If technology makes
access easier and more affordable, then it is likely that more people will
produce their own and negatively affect the gun industry. Much like the fear
Congress held that if all farmers withheld wheat for personal use then it
would negatively impact the agricultural market, so too Congress should
rightly fear that the ability to freely manufacture one's own weapons with the
relative ease that 3-D printing provides would negatively impact the gun in-
dustry, which is a pillar of the U.S. economy.
In conclusion, anytime Congress attempts to regulate access to firearms
it is controversial. And while a Second Amendment analysis is outside the
scope of this Comment, there are real issues there that Congress would need
to weigh carefully before drafting any legislation. However, Congress has a
clear ability to regulate and protect the channels of interstate commerce.
"Protect" is the vital word in this analysis because projects like Defense Dis-
tributed would bring significant changes to the gun industry's market share.
Thus, Congress has the ability and the duty to protect the channels of inter-
state commerce; sometimes even against itself. An all-out ban of 3-D printed
firearms is probably out of the question, but limited permits and steep fines
or criminal action could be a strong first step in controlling what is likely to
be the future of manufacturing. The law has always struggled to keep pace
with technology and 3-D printing is no different; yet, the stakes are high and
advancements are moving at a rapid pace. Congress will act. Congress has
the power and precedent to protect and regulate the stream of commerce by
restricting access to information on the Internet or denying the ability to
home-manufacture certain products like firearms.
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